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– Automation often operates well for a range of situations but requires human 
intervention to handle boundary conditions (Woods & Cook, 2006)
• Opaque
– Automation interfaces often do not facilitate understanding or tracking of the system 
(Lyons, 2013)
• Miscalibrated Trust
– Disuse and misuse of automation have lead to real-world mishaps and tragedies (Lee 
& See, 2004; Lyons & Stokes, 2012)
• Out–of-the-Loop Loss of Situation Awareness
– Trade-off: automation helps manual performance and workload but recovering from 
automation failure is often worse (Endsley, 2016; Onnasch, Wickens, Li, Manzey, 
2014)
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HAT Solutions to Problems with Automation
• Brittle
– Negotiated decisions puts a layer of human flexibility into system behavior
• Opaque
– Requires that systems be designed to be transparent, present rationale and 
confidence
– Communication should be in terms the operator can easily understand (shared 
language)
• Miscalibrated Trust
– Automation display of rationale helps human operator know when to trust it
• Out–of-the-Loop Loss of Situation Awareness
– Keep operator in control; adaptable, not adaptive automation





Autonomous Constrained Flight Planner (ACFP)
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Recommended airports  
- rank ordered.
Original




Adding HAT Principles to the Ground Station
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Adding HAT Principles to the Ground Station
• Transparency: Divert reasoning and 
factor weights are displayed.
• Negotiation/Dialog: Operators can 
change factor weights to match their 
priorities.
• Shared Language/Communication: 
Numeric output from ACFP was found 
to be misleading by pilots. Display now 
uses English categorical descriptions.
12
Adding HAT Principles to the Ground Station
• Human-Directed: Operator calls “Plays” to determine who does what
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HAT Simulation: Tasks
• Participants, with the help of automation, monitored 30 aircraft 
– Alerted pilots when
• Aircraft was off path or pilot failed to comply with clearances
• Significant weather events affect aircraft trajectory
• Pilot failed to act on EICAS alerts
– Rerouted aircraft when
• Weather impacted the route
• System failures or medical events force diversions
• Ran with HAT tools and without HAT tools
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HAT Simulation: Results
• Participants preferred the HAT condition overall (rated 8.5 out of 9).
• HAT displays and automation preferred for keeping up with operationally 
important issues (rated 8.67 out of 9)
• HAT displays and automation provided enough situational awareness to 
complete the task (rated 8.67 out of 9)
• HAT displays and automation reduced the workload relative to no HAT (rated 




• HAT workload reduction was marginally significant (HAT mean 1.7; No HAT 




– “This [the recommendations table] is wonderful…. You would not find a dispatcher 
who would just be comfortable with making a decision without knowing why.”
• Negotiation
– “The sliders was [sic] awesome, especially because you can customize the route…. I 
am able to see what the difference was between my decision and [the computer’s 
decision].”
• Human-Directed Plays
– “This one was definitely awesome. Sometimes [without HAT] I even took my own 
decisions and forgot to look at the QRH because I was very busy, but that didn’t 
happen when I had the HAT.”
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Where we are and planned FY17 work
• Trust repair with automated system part-task 
• Implementing HAT features on the flight deck 
• Developing a software framework for creating HAT Agents
• Updating ground station re-routing tool
• UX testing
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Summer ’17 (Ground Station Agent)
Spring ’17 (Flight Deck)
Now (Transparency Part Task)
CHAP-E
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• Abstract idea of what will happen next
– Abstract plans, not fully defined (instantiated) at start
• Partially ordered, conditions on tasks
– Some tasks can be completed in any order
– Timing is dependent on circumstances
• Precise tasks become more clear as time goes on
– Interleaved execution and expansion
– Clearance changes, weather, equipment failures, errors cause plan revision
– Monitoring/projection detects failures, triggers revision
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Flight (from, to)
FileFPlan(from,to,alt) ObtainClearance Taxi(rnwy) Fly(from,to) Taxi(gate) Shutdown









Subtasks: T1, T2, T3, T4
Constraints/Limitations: T1 -> T3, C -> T3
• Planner
– Expansion of tasks using methods








































































Flight Processes Periodic Monitoring / Triggers
Clearance Process
ATC: "NASA123 clear for 
ILS approach to RWY 28R 
speed <airspeed> to 
descend via MODESTO 5”
Clearance Monitoring
Airspeed Monitoring
Inform PF: “Check speed”
Airspeed Setting Process
Is airspeed  
within limits?
No














cleared ILS to 





Set MCP altitude to 
<altitude>
Verify altitude Verify altitude
Altitude Monitoring






























Request Flaps to 
<flaps setting>









Inform PF: “Check altitude”
Yes
Move flaps to <flaps setting>








within limits? FMAs ..?

















































































• Execution monitors check aircraft situation
• Remedial actions to repair plan









– Gantt chart style
• Based on location of aircraft
• Timeline of best start times (not 
duration)























Focus on Operational Decision Making
Evolution from Pilot Decision Support to Human-Autonomy Teaming
Qantas A380 Uncontained Engine Failure
Explosion of Alert Messages
 QF 32;  Singapore to Sydney; 469 people on board
 4 minutes after Take-off, engine no. 2 bursts, severely 
damaging other equipment
 43 ECAM messages in first 60 seconds; 10 additional later
 50 minutes to sort through the non-normal checklists (NNCs)
“It was hard to work out a list of 
what had failed; it was getting to 
be too much to follow.  So we 
inverted our logic: Instead of 
worrying about what failed, I 
said ‘Let’s look at what’s 





checklist (NNC) tied 
to a component failure Complete NNCs,
as needed
Use “Notes” to identify
operational limitations
Make decision








No Decision Aid 
/ Support
Current Approach to Aircraft System Alerting
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Stopping Distance (on runway)
Ability to perform a specific approach
Ability to enter RVSM airspace
Airplane system 
components have failed
What can I do?
Where can I go?
Explicit Alerting on Capabilities
Typically, we don’t
787
449 EICAS messages (Warning, Caution, Advisory)




Explicit Alerting on Capabilities
Sometimes, we do . . . .
Examples from the 787
 NO AUTOLAND
 NO LAND 3
 NAV UNABLE RNP
 STALL PROTECTION
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The New Generation of Systems is Different
So are the pilots . . . . 
Airplane System Integration        Pilot System Knowledge
 Airplanes have become more integrated–more shared resources, more 
interconnections–and failures can have effects that are difficult to 
anticipate or understand
 The volume and rate of crew alert and status messages can increase 
significantly for certain types of failures
 Non-normal procedure design for combinations of failures is challenging
 Air turnbacks or diversions occur due to confusion about severity of the 
failures, and impact on the mission
Both types of errors occur:  
- Poor understanding of real problems
- Oversensitivity to trivial changes
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Three Types of Information for the Pilot 
Answering Basic Questions
 Status of Airplane Capabilities
 What is working/what is not?
 How can I restore what has been lost?
 Operational Guidance
 Which limitations do I need to observe during the 
remainder of the mission?
 Mission Objectives
 Can I still complete the planned mission?




Present an overview of
airplane capabilities
(in addition to EICAS/ECAM)






















Goals: reconfigure systems to restore
as much capability as possible;
understand generally what is possible 
Goals: operate with an 
understanding of ops
limitations for remaining flight; 
do not “fly into”
new problems
Goals: understand where you can 
go and where is “best” to go;
look at trade-offs; understand risks
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Thinking about Human-Autonomy Teaming
 Initially, we pull together information relevant to mission/diversion; e.g., 
airplane compatibility / capability (range)
airport information
weather information
Then, organize it in a way that flight crews can benefit, understanding 
how to present it to support collaborative decision making
Finally, transition some elements to a more autonomous advisor
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Planned Activities
Develop a “framework/language” for communicating airplane 
capabilities
Pilot interviews and prototyping
Develop a small set of failure cases 
Develop system models to simulate system failures
Collaborate with industry (e.g. SAA with Boeing)
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Thank you
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